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COMMENTS
The power of the husband to donate movables by particular
title is the primary source of potential injury to the wife. This
power has been too liberally interpreted to provide an effective
balance between the rights of the wife and the discretion neces-
sary for the husband to administer the community, particularly
in modern times when the greatest wealth consists of movable
property.
Alterations in the present system of control and manage-
ment of the community should be carefully weighed in light of
two considerations: as the husband and his separate estate are
liable for community debts even after termination of the com-
munity, he should have sufficient discretion to administer it
effectively; the wife does not need protection against the bona
fide acts of her husband as she can absolve herself from his
mismanagement by renouncing the community on its termina-
tion.
Autley B. Newton
SETTLEMENT OF COMMUNITY RIGHTS
In the Louisiana community property system, most prop-
erty acquired during marriage is held by the conjugal partner-
ship or community of acquets and gains, rather than by the
spouses in their individual capacities.' Thus, upon the com-
munity's termination, there must be some sort of settlement so
that the spouses or their heirs may receive their appropriate
shares. Generally, a settlement entails computation of the total
value of the community assets, substraction of the community
debts outstanding, and division of the residue between the for-
mer husband and wife, or their heirs.
SETTLEMENTS- JUDICIAL OR CONVENTIONAL
Although the law contemplates that there shall be a liquida-
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2332 (1870): "The partnership, or community of
acquets or gains, needs not to be stipulated; it exists by operation of law, in
all cases where there is no stipulation to the contrary. But the parties may
modify or limit it; they may even agree that it shall not exist."
Id. art. 2399: "Every marriage contracted in this State, superinduces of
right partnership or community of acquets or gains, if there be no stipulation
to the contrary."
See also id. arts. 2334, 2404: Comments, 25 LA. L. REv. 95 (1964).
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tion of the community after its dissolution,2 Louisiana law pre-
scribes no detailed procedure by which this liquidation is to be
effected in all cases. If all interested persons concur, frequently
the community may be settled without judicial proceedings.3 If
the interested persons cannot agree, judicial proceedings are
necessary.
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENTS
Judicial settlement may be required in two distinct situa-
tions. The first situation arises when the community is termi-
nated by the death of one spouse. In such case the Code of Civil
Procedure contemplates that the community shall be settled in
the succession proceedings.4 The surviving spouse must petition
to be put in possession of his half of the community. 5 Frequently
the petition for possession is simply a formality, but the sur-
viving spouse is entitled to immediate possession only if the
succession is realtively free from debt.6 If the succession re-
quires administration, the succession representative, not the
surviving spouse, is entitled to corporeal possession of all prop-
erty of the community. 7 These rules imposed by the Code of
Civil Procedure are based on practical considerations. The Lou-
isiana inheritance tax statute requires most successions to be
opened judicially.8 Convenience and economy recommend settle-
2. Tomme v. Tomme, 174 La. 123, 128, 139 So. 901, 903 (1932) : "The law
contemplates that there shall be a liquidation, a settlement of the community
affairs after its dissolution, without which there is no way of ascertaining the
new value thereof. Under no theory can it be said that the former husband owes
his divorced wife anything unless a liquidation of the community shows some
net amount remaining in his bands after the property is disposed of and the
debts are paid."
3. E.g., Saunier v. Saunier, 217 La. 607, 47 So. 2d 19 (1950); Haddad v.
Haddad, 120 La. 218, 45 So. 109 (1907). No cases were found holding that
there could be a conventional settlement after the death of one spouse, thus it
seems probable that a conventional settlement is possible only when the com-
munity is dissolved during the lives of the spouses.
4. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3001-3004, 3031 (1960).
5. Id. art. 3001. The judgment of possession is required because of the Lou-
isiana inheritance tax statute [see note 8 infra], and not because of the sub-
stantive law of community property.
6. Ibid.
7. Cf. id. arts. 3004, 3211; Simpson v. Colvin, 138 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1962).
8. LA. R.S. 47:2413 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 35, § 1,
provides: "A. It is unlawful for any heir, legatee or other beneficiary of .a
donation mortis causa to take or be in possession of any part of the things or
property comprising the inheritance, legacy or other donation, or to dispose of
the same or any part thereof, until he has obtained the authority of the court
to that effect, except as provided in R.S. 47:2410; and in case he shall so take
or be in possession or shall so dispose of such things or property, or any part
thereof, he shall no longer have the right of renouncing the inheritance or donation
[Vol. XXV
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ment of the community in the same proceedings as the succes-
sion. If the succession has relatively large debts, sale of prop-
erty may be necessary.9 The deceased spouse's half interest in
this community is subject to sale to satisfy the debts. Since that
half interest is an undivided interest, it follows that the succes-
sion representative should be entitled to possession of the entire
community pending complete settlement of the succession.
Secondly, judicial settlement is necessary when the com-
munity is terminated while both spouses are still alive and an
amicable settlement cannot be agreed on. In this case only a
suit to partition the community, but no administration similar
to succession proceedings, is contemplated. 10 The Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure provides that the suit to partition the com-
munity property may be brought either as an incident of the
action which would result in a dissolution of the community, or
as a separate action.1' However, the suit must be brought to
mortis causa, and shall remain personally liable for the tax thereon; but he may,
without waiting for authority, do any acts that may seem necessary to preserve
the property from waste, damage or loss.
"B. Unless the tax due under this Part has been paid, or unless it is deter-
mined judicially in the manner prescribed herein that no tax is due: (1) no
bank, banker, trust company, warehouseman, depository, or other person having
on deposit, or having possession or control of, any money, credits, goods, or other
things or rights of value which belonged to a deceased person, or in which the
latter had an interest, shall deliver any such money or property to any heirs or
legatees of the deceased person; and (2) no corporation shall transfer to any
heirs or legatees of a deceased person any stock or registered bonds of such cor-
poration which were owned by the deceased person. Except as provided herein-
after, any person or corporation so making delivery or transfer shall be liable
for the tax.
"A person or corporation may deliver or transfer money or property which
belonged to a deceased person, without incurring any liability for the tax due
under this Part, to: (1) the succession representative of the deceased who sub-
mits a certified copy of the letters issued to him by a court of competent juris-
diction; or (2) the surviving spouse, heirs, or legatees of the deceased who
submit a certified copy of the judgment of possession rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction which evidences their right to the possession of the money
or property so delivered or transferred. A certified copy of such a judgment of
possession constitutes full proof of the payment of all taxes due under this Part,
or that no such tax is due.
LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2951 (1960) : "No judgment of possession
shall be rendered, no inheritance or legacy shall be delivered, and no succession
representative shall be discharged unless satisfactory proof has been submitted
to the court that no inheritance taxes are due by the heirs or legatees, or that
all such taxes have been paid, or that the maximum amount claimed by the
inheritance tax collector has been deposited in the registry of the court pending
judicial determination of the amount due."
9. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3261 (1960).
10. The probable reason for not requiring an administration when the com-
munity is terminated for a cause other than death is that the inheritance tax
statute is not applicable; it is probably more economical to settle the community
without an administration.
11. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 82 (1960) : "Except as otherwise pro-
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liquidate the whole community; it cannot be partitioned in a
piecemeal fashion. 12 Since there are no further procedural
statutes applicable, once the suit is properly instituted, the court
is relatively free to prescribe the particular method by which
the settlement is to be effected. Generally, the court will order
the taking of an inventory and then divide the property in ac-
cordance with the provisions for the partition of property in
general. 18 In case the judgment inadvertently omits some com-
munity property, a later suit pertaining to property not included
in the first can still be maintained.14
It is uncertain by what method the court may divide a com-
munity composed of several pieces of property when it would be
highly prejudicial to one spouse to divide his interest in a spe-
vided in the second paragraph of this article, an action to partition community
property shall be brought either as an incident of the action which would result
in a dissolution of the community, or as a separate action in the parish where the
judgment dissolving the community was rendered.
"If the community owns immovable property, the action to partition the com-
munity property, movable and immovable, may be brought in the parish where
any of the immovable property is situated."
White v. White, 153 La. 313, 95 So. 791 (1923) held that an action for parti-
tion could be included in a suit for separation from bed and board.
. See also LA. Con OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3001-3004, 3031, 3462 (1960),
which allow the surviving spouse of an intestate to be recognized by the court
on an ex parte petition as entitled to the possession of an undivided half of the
community property, and of the other undivided half to the extent that she has
the usufruct thereof, without an administration of the succession, when the com-
munity is accepted and the succession is relatively free of debt.
12. Daigre v. Daigre, 230 La. 472, 477, 89 So. 2d 41, 43 (1956) : "If partial
partition of communities or of partnerships is permitted it would foster multiplicity
of actions and protract the liquidation of such communities and partnerships. In
fact, the liquidation of a community could by such means be delayed over a period
of years." The court further stated that "to permit piecemeal partition of this
community would hamper and delay the liquidation of this community and the
same rule would govern this community partnership that governs ordinary part-
nerships. These rules expedite the liquidation of the partnerships. Moreover, it
would be impossible for this Court to give the plaintiff a money judgment against
the defendant because after the debts are paid, if any, it may be that her interest
in the community would be less than the amount prayed for." Id. at 482, 89
So. 2d at 45.
13. See Rhodes v. Rhodes, 190 La. 370, 182 So. 541 (1938).
14. Adkins v. Cason, 170 So. 366 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936). In the second suit
the court based its holding on the fact that prior court had not given any con-
sideration to the property involved: "We are convinced that the court did not
give consideration to the property herein involved in ordering a partition of the
effects of the community. The fact that no inventory whatever is contained in
the record of the separation suit and that all of the proceedings, including the
judgment, are silent with reference to real estate, is the basis for this conviction.
If the question of ownership of the property had been in contest therein, certainly
an adjudication on its title would have been shown in the court's decree. Taking
-cognizance of the principle that the plea of res judicata is stricti juris, and being
of the opinion that a partition of the litigated interest was not an object of the
judgment in the separation suit, we must necessarily hold that Mrs. Cason did
not lose the rights, by reason of such judgment, which she herein asserts." Id.
at 371.
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cific piece of property. For example, assume that the com-
munity has a 60 percent interest in a business established during
marriage and managed by the husband; that the interest is
presently worth $50,000; and that there is $50,000 worth of
other community property remaining after the payment of debts
on the date of dissolution. Is the wife entitled to demand half
of the interest in the business and thus destroy the husband's
majority control, or can she be required to take $50,000 in other
community property? There are some indications in the juris-
prudence that the wife can demand a half interest in each spe-
cific piece of community property remaining on dissolution of
the community.1 5 This position is consistent with judicial pro-
nouncements that the spouses are considered owners in indivi-
sion of the community property after the community termi-
nates.16 But in extreme cases in which one spouse would be
unnecessarily prejudiced, it is submitted that the courts should
have discretion to divide the community in an equitable manner.
For example, in the circumstances just indicated the wife would
gain nothing by forcing the husband to divide the business in-
terest with her, while the husband would lose his control of the
business. A court should be able to order the wife to take other
community property of equivalent value and allow the husband
to keep the business intact.
CONVENTIONAL SETTLEMENTS
Conventional settlement, in which the spouses contractually
divide the community, is the other basic method of liquidation."
The spouses can adopt any basis of settlement they choose after
termination of the community.'8 Although contracts between
15. The statement was made in Miller v. Blackwell, 142 La. 571, 573, 77 So.
285, 286 (1918) that "upon the death of the wife the property of the community
devolved upon her heirs and surviving husband in indivision, which means that
each owned her or his proportionate interest in the most remote atom of which
that property was composed." In the recent case of Succession of Heckert, 160
So. 2d 375, 381 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), where the forced heirs were claiming
the deceased wife's share of the community, the court upheld the forced heirs
claim and stated that "petitioners did not merely own a certain number of shares
in the stock of S. H. Kress and Co., but actually owned one-half of each of the
certificates."
16. It has often been held that when there is a judgment dissolving the mar-
riage, the parties become co-owners in indivision of the property which belonged
to the materimonial community and either spouse has the right to provoke ajudicial partition of this property. See, e.g., Daigre v. Daigre, 230 La. 472, 89
So. 2d 41 (1956) ; Giglio v. Giglio, 159 La. 46, 105 So. 95 (1925).17. In cases where the community is terminated by death, it is unlikely that
a conventional settlement is possible. See note 3 supra.
18. See Haddad v. Haddad, 120 La. 218, 45 So. 109 (1907).
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husband and wife are generally prohibited, transfers of prop-
erty to settle the marital community after its termination are
permitted contracts.19
Once the parties consummate a valid contract with full
knowledge of the pertinent facts, they are prevented from
making a claim against the other based on any matter included
within the terms of the settlement.20 The courts, however, have
subjected conventional settlements to close scrutiny due to the
advantages the husband as head and master of the community
has over the wife during marriage.2 1 Since the property is
under the husband's supervision and control, and he is able to
deal with it without the wife's knowledge and consent, he is
likely to be more familiar with the true value of the community
: 19. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1790 (1870) provides: "Besides the general in-
capacity which persons of certain descriptions are under, there are others ap-
plicable only to certain contracts, either in relation to the parties, such as a hus-
band and wife ...whose contracts with each other are forbidden ...."
Id. art. 2446 contains certain exceptions: "A contract of sale, between hus-
band and wife, can take place only in the three following cases: (1) When one
of ;the spouses makes a transfer of property to the other, who is judicially sep-
arated from him or her, in payment of his or her rights. (2) When the transfer
made by the husband to his wife, even though not separated, has a legitimate
cause, as the replacing of her dotal or other effects alienated. (3) When the wife
makes a transfer of property to her husband, in payment of a sum promised to
him as a dowry. Saving, in these three cases, to the heirs of the contracting
parties, their rights, if there exist any indirect advantage." See Guillot v. Guillot,
141 La. 86, 74 So. 704 (1917).
20. Mayerv. Hill, 161 So. 208, 209 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935) : "The record
leaves no doubt that a full and complete settlement was intended by the parties
and it necessarily results that, when that settlement was consummated, if each
of the parties had full knowledge of all pertinent facts, that settlement fully estops
either to make claim against the other on any matter which was intended to be,
included in and precluded by that settlement." Settlement contracts were also
approved in Saunier v. Saunier, 217 La. 607, 47 So. 2d 19 (1950) and Haddad v.
Haddad, 120 La. 218, 45 So. 109 (1907).
21. See Lee v. Lee, 214 La. 434, 441, 38 So. 2d 66, 68 (1948) : "We must
bear in mind that the parties to this contract or agreement were not strangers
dealing with each other at arm's length, but had the relationship of husband
and wife to each other. Mr. Lee, as head and master of the community, was in
a position to sell and dispose of the community property without the knowledge
and consent of his wife. The property was under his supervision and control,
and, with the advantage which this position gave to him, he practically, if not
positively, coerced his wife to accept the settlement, knowing full well at the
time that he had withheld from her the true value of the property belonging to
the community and also knowing that she had been forced into a position, without
the benefit of counsel, of accepting a settlement subject to his own terms. In our
opinion, under the circumstances in this case the husband did not discharge his
duty to deal fairly and justly with his wife." Further in its opinion the court
said that "since they are husband and wife, and since the husband by virtue of
his superior position may compel his wife to settle the community for less than
her share, this court will scrutinize such contracts with the utmost care in order
to ascertain whether he has coerced his wife by any circumstances into signing
an unfair settlement agreement." Id. at 442, 38 So. 2d at 69.
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assets and the extent of the community liabilities. 2 2 Accordingly,
successful attacks on such contracts have been based on fraud,2 3
error,2 4 and lesion,25 with the court applying these concepts in
a somewhat lenient manner. Thus, one court placed the burden
of proof on the husband to explain what had happened to all
community property shown by his books to have been in his
possession a few months prior to the dissolution of the com-
munity when the property was not mentioned in the contract.26
In another case in which the wife transferred her interest in the
community for the husband's promise to pay the community
debts,2 7 the court considered it immaterial whether there was
fraud or mistake because the wife had received no consideration
for the agreement. 2  Finally, the court in a recent case based a
finding of error on the fact that the wife was an elderly lady,
unable to read and write, and inexperienced in business or finan-
cial matters.2
As would be expected, when a settlement contract is
rescinded, the community is considered as if no settlement had
been made and is again open for liquidation.3 0 The parties are
22. Ibid.
23. Lee v. Lee, 214 La. 434, 38 So. 2d 66 (1948).
24. Bruyninckx v. Woodward, 217 La. 736, 47 So. 2d 478 (1950). In this
case the defendant contended that the plaintiff could annul the contract she en-
tered in settlement of her community rights only if the plaintiff could prove fraud
or misrepresentation. The court rejected this contention stating, "The first
proposition of defendants is not at all impressive as plaintiff's evidence is most
convincing that, aside from any misrepresentations, she was acting under an error
of fact and law when she executed the so-called contract in full settlement of
her community interest." Id. at 744, 47 So. 2d at 481. Accord, Berry v. Franklin
State Bank & Trust Co., 186 La. 623, 173 So. 126 (1937).
25. Beatty v. Vining, 147 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962). The court held
that a wife who received approximately $9,900 in movable and immovable prop-
erty and cash at the time she entered into a voluntary partition of community
assets, leaving the husband with property valued at approximately $105,000, sus-
tained.such lesion as entitled her to a rescission of the partition contract.
26. See Hill v. Hill, 115 La. 489, 39 So. 503 (1905).
27. This type of bilateral contract should be distinguished from the wife's
right to renounce the community by a unilateral act in order to relieve herself
of liability for community debts. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2410 (1870).
28. Berry v. Franklin State Bank & Trust Co., 186 La. 623, 633, 173 So. 126,
129 (1937): "[I]t manifestly appears that, whether Mr. Berry intended to
practice fraud upon his divorced wife or whether he was mistaken as to the
amount of debts which he owed and the value of the property, Mrs. Berry re-
linquished her interest in a valuable estate for no consideration whatever." Cer-
tainly, the husband's promise to pay the debts was a consideration, or more
technically a valid cause, sufficient to support the contract.
29. Bruyninckx v. Woodward, 217 La. 736, 47 So. 2d 478 (1950).
30. See Berry v. Franklin State Bank & Trust Co., 186 La. 623, 639, 173
So. 126, 132 (1937) : "The purpose of the contract entered into by plaintiff and
T. V. Berry after the divorce was granted was to settle the community affairs.
irhat contract being null and void, it follows that there has been no settlement
of the community and that it remains open for settlement."
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required to restore all property received under the contract if
they still own it.31 Good faith purchasers cannot be affected. 32
However, according to one court, the aggrieved party is entitled
to a personal judgment against the other for half the market
value of the property as of the date of the contract.33 Use of the
date of the contract for valuation purposes can be questioned in
cases in which the date of dissolution differs from the date of
the contract. In such a case the value on the date of dissolution
should control as the contract is considered null and of no
effect.84
DIVISION OF COMMUNITY
Article 2406 of the Civil Code provides the basic rule that
"the effects which compose the partnership or community of
gains or divided into two equal portions between the husband
and the wife, or between their heirs, at the dissolution of the
marriage."8 5 Thus, for the purpose of settlement community
property must be distinguished from separate property, as
article 2406 applies only to community property. 6
The liquidation of the community depends upon the con-
dition of the community at the date of dissolution.37 In con-
31. See Ruffino v. Hunt, 234 La. 91, 103, 99 So. 2d 34, 39 (1958): "Since
this first settlement was void, the parties were required to restore to the com-
munity all property received under it."
32. See Beatty v. Vining, 147 So. 2d 37, 50 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) : "Where
property acquired by one of the parties in an act of partition has been sold
prior to the institution of an action for a rescission, the original vendee has a
personal responsibility to the vendor. Where a husband sold a portion of prop-
erty received in a partition of a community estate, an action by the former wife
for a rescission of the partition is limited to the property the husband acquired
in the partition and of which he remained the owner. An action to rescind, be-
cause of lesion, does not extend to good-faith purchasers. The aggrieved party is,
however, entitled to a personal judgment against the other for one-half of the
market value of the property so sold, evaluated as of the date of partition."
33. Ibid.
34. Berry v. Franklin State Bank & Trust Co., 186 La. 623, 173 So. 126
(1937).
35. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2406 (1870).
36. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 95 (1964). One of the basic articles in-
volved in the settlement of community rights is LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2408 (1870),
which provides, "When the separate property of either the husband or the wife
has been increased or improved during the marriage, the other spouse, or his or
her heirs, shall be entitled to the reward of one half of the value of the increase
or ameliorations, if it be proved that the increase is due only to the ordinary
course of things, to the rise in the value of property, or to the chances of trade."
This article has been omitted from direct consideration in this Comment, due to
the fact two recent articles have thoroughly covered it. See Huie, Separate
Claims to Reimbursement from Community Property in Louisiana, 27 TUL. L.
REV. 143 (1953) ; Comment, 73 TUL. L. REV. 506 (1963).
37. Bartoli v. Huguenard, 39 La. Ann. 411, 418, 2 So. 196, 198 (1887) : "The
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formity with this principle, it was held prior to the amendment
to article 15538 that the value placed on community property
in an inventory at the time of suit for separation must yield to
the actual value of the property at the date of separation, as
the dissolution did not occur until separation. 9 Article 155 now
makes the judgment of separation retroactive to the date the
petition was filed. 40 But the amendment should not affect an
inventory taken voluntarily prior to suit for separation: it
should yield to the value of the community property at the time
the suit was filed. The date of dissolution is also important
because the property that is included within the community at
that time is subject to the payment of community debts and the
residue is divided between the spouses.
41
When community property has been alienated prior to the
date of dissolution, the property itself should not be considered
directly in the settlement, although the proceeds derived from
the sale may be used in calculating the balance of community
assets over liabilities. 42 The effect given the proceeds derived
from the sale depends on whether they have been disposed of
prior to the date of dissolution. If they have been consumed by
the community, 43 they would not be directly included in the
settlement; but if the proceeds have not been disposed of, they
would be a community asset to be divided equally between the
partition and settlement of the community must be predicated upon the condition
of things at the date of dissolution. Whatever property there is remaining at that
date is subject to the payment of community debts, and the residue may be
divided between the spouses."
38. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 155 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1962, No. 178,
5 1, provides: "The judgment of separation from bed and board carries with it
the separation of goods and effects and is retroactive to the date on which the
petition for same was filed, but such retroactive effect shall be without prejudice
(a) to the liability of the community for the attorneys' fees and costs incurred
by the wife in the action in which the judgment is rendered, or (b) to rights
validly acquired in the interim between commencement of the action and recorda-
tion of the judgment. . ....
39. Klienpeter v. Klienpeter, 198 So. 413 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940).
40. See note 38 8upra.
41. E.g., Bartoli v. Huguenard, 39 La. Ann. 411, 2 So. 196 (1887) ; Washing-
ton v. Palmer, 213 La. 79, 34 So. 2d 382 (1948).
42. See Succession of Webre, 49 La. Ann. 1491, 1494, 22 So. 390, 392 (1897),
where the court said: "Property disposed of at the date of dissolution of the com-
munity should not directly figure as an item of debit or credit, although it may
enter into an account as an item, and be considered in fixing balances of profits
or balances of losses of the community."
43. In case the proceeds were consumed by the separate estate of one of the
spouses, the community may have a claim for reimbursement under LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 2408 (1870). See Huie, Separate Claims to Reimbursement from Com-
munity Property in Louisiana, 27 TUL. L. REV. 143 (1953) ; Comment, 37 TUL.
L. REV. 506 (1963).
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former spouses. For example, if a community immovable is sold
during marriage, the proceeds belong to the community to be
divided by the spouses on dissolution; but if these proceeds are
partly or wholly consumed by the community before dissolution,
the consumed portion would not affect the settlement.
Article 2407 of the Civil Code provides for the equal division
of separately owned cattle in gestation, and of "the fruits hang-
ing by the roots" on the lands belonging separately to either
the husband or the wife, at the time of the dissolution of the
marriage." The court has allowed the deduction of the neces-
sary expenses of cultivating the crop by the person who incurred
them before the division.
45
PAYMENT OF DEBTS
In the partition of the community, both husband and wife
are equally liable for their share of the community debts con-
tracted during marriage and not acquitted at the time of its
dissolution.46 The wife is able to relieve herself of liability for
the community debts by renouncing the community,47 or she
may limit her liability by accepting under benefit of inventory.48
These debts must be paid before the community property can be
distributed.4 9  Since the Civil Code does not elaborate on the
obligation to discharge community debts after dissolution of
the community, the courts have invented the concept of a fic-
44. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2407 (1870) : "The fruits hanging by the roots on the
lands belonging separately to either the husband or the wife, at the time of the
dissolution of the marriage, are equally divided between the husband and the wife
or their heirs. It is the same with respect to the young of cattle yet in gestation."
This article has been applied to crops growing at the time of dissolution. Harrell
v. Harrell, 12 La. Ann. 549 (1857) ; Wilcox v. Henderson, 9 La. Ann. 347
(1854) ; Rosata v. Cali, 4 So. 2d 54 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
45. In re Jones, 41 La. Ann. 620, 6 So. 180 (1889).
46. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2409 (1870) : "It is understood that, in the partition
of the effects of the partnership or community of gains, both husband and wife
are to be equally liable for their share of the debts contracted during the marriage,
and not acquitted at the time of its dissolution." See Washington v. Palmer, 213
La. 79, 34 So. 2d 382 (1948) and LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950).
47. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2410 (1870).
48. LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950) ; Washington v. Palmer, 213 La. 79, 34 So. 2d
382 (1948).
49. E.g., Tomme v. Tomme, 174 La. 123, 139 So. 901 (1932); Bartoli v.
Huguenard, 39 La. Ann. 411, 2 So. 196 (1887). This restriction on the dis-
tribution of property before the payment of debts is probably limited to judicial
settlements. No cases were found which annulled a conventional settlement be-
cause the property was distributed before the debts were paid. In such a case the
creditor's remedy would be against each of the former spouses individually. Se4
Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 201 (1964) for a discussion of the rights of community
creditors.
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titious community which exists after the termination of the
actual community in order that the debts may be paid. 50 The
concept of the fictitious community allows community debts to
be satisfied out of the mass of assets owned by the community
at the time of its termination and provides a reasonable mode
of liquidating community liabilities.
Administration of the fictitious community is somewhat un-
certain. It has been held that the death of the wife does not
deprive the husband of the right to make bona fide settlements
for the payment of community debts. 51 This right may be avail-
able only to the husband who is personally liable for the com-
munity debts and not to the wife who has the privilege of
accepting or renouncing the community and the debts which
go with it. 52 Consistent with this point of view is the holding
that the husband can have community property sold at public
sale after dissolution to pay community debts. 53 If in settling
the community the husband pays community debts with his sep-
arate funds, he is entitled to reimbursement for half the amount
paid."
In some cases it is difficult to determine whether certain
borderline expenes were a debt of the community or a debt of
50. E.g., Washington v. Palmer, 213 La. 79, 34 So. 2d 382 (1948) ; Newman
v. Cooper, 46 La. Ann. 1485, 16 So. 481 (1894); Succession of Dumestre, 42
La. Ann. 411, 7 So. 624 (1890). See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 241 (1964).
51. Rusk v. Warren, 25 La. Ann. 314 (1873).
52. Hawley v. Crescent City Bank, 26 La. Ann. 230, 232 (1874): "Upon the
dissolution of the community by the death of the wife, the responsibility of the
husband in regard to the community debts, is not changed. He is absolutely and
personally bound for their payment; and his separate property may be seized and
sold for their acquittal. This being his position, he has under his control the com-
munity property which by law is expressly subjected to the payment of the com-
munity debts; and he has, so far as the final settlement and liquidation of the com-
munity after its dissolution is concerned, the same rights he had during its exist-
ence; because he is, after the dissolution, under the same responsibilities for the
community debts that he was before the dissolution. It is but just that he should
have those powers. The community property continues under his control until the
debts are paid. Until their final settlement and discharge, the heirs have no abso-
lute rights to the property of the community that can be legally recognized. Their
interest in it continues contingent and uncertain, until by the result of the final
discharge of all the obligations of the community, it is known whether or not
there are assets remaining for partition between the survivor and the heirs of the
deceased spouse."
Several cases have indicated that the wife may, after the husband's death, use
community property to pay community debts. See Saloy v. Chexnaidre, 14 La.
Ann. 567 (1859) ; Succession of Pratte, 12 La. Ann. 457 (1857) ; Cook-Douglas
Co. v. Prudhomme, 127 So. 104 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930) ; Gaddis Co. v. Litton,
121 So. 334 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1929).
53. Elizardi v. Kelly, 115 La. 712, 39 So. 851 (1905).
54. Phillips v. Phillips, 176 La. 983, 147 So. 53 (1933).
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the separate estate of one of the spouses. The costs of settling
the community, 5 the attorney's fees in a suit for separation
or divorce,56 and the expenses of last illness 57 have all been held
to be debts of the community. However, funeral expenses are
not community obligations and thus must be paid out of the
deceased's separate estate.58
Article 150 of the Civil Code limits the rights of the husband
in separation cases by providing: "From the day on which the
action of separation shall be brought, it shall not be lawful for
the husband to contract any debt on account of the community,
nor to dispose of the immovables belonging to the same, and
any alienation by him made after that time shall be null, if it
be proved that such alienation was made with the fraudulent
view of injuring the rights of the wife." 59 In two recent court
of appeal decisions it was held that article 150 distinguished
between the contracting of a debt, and an alienation.60 Accord-
ing to these cases, any debts contracted after the suit for sep-
aration is filed are unlawful whether contracted with a fraudu-
55. ibid.; Vicknair v. Terracina, 168 La. 417, 122 So. 276 (1929).
56. Vicknair v. Terracina, 168 La. 417, 122 So. 276 (1929) ; Bryan v. Stirling,
170 So. 500 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936).
57. Maggio v. Papa, 206 La. 38, 18 So. 2d 645 (1944).
58. E.g., Maggio v. Papa, 206 La. 38, 18 So. 2d 645 (1944) ; Succession of
Pizzati, 141 La. 645, 75 So. 498 (1917) ; Womack v. McCook Bros. Funeral Home,
192 So. 756 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
59. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 150 (1870). In the case of Gastauer v. Gastauer, 143
La. 749, 79 So. 326 (1918), a note and mortgage were executed by the husband
after he had brought suit for divorce and discontinued it. The wife contended that
the purpose of the discontinuance was to relieve the husband from the limitations
imposed by article 150. The court held: "[N]o matter what may have been the
motive of the discontinuance the suit was none the less discontinued, and that,
a divorce suit being no longer pending, the disability incident to the pendency of
such a suit no longer existed." Id. at 752, 79 So. at 327. In the case of Seiambra
v. Sciambra, 153 So. 2d 441, 443 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) the court held that
"since the wife's suit was dismissed, the date of the filing of her suit is of no
importance and considered as never filed. However, the date of filing the hus-
band's reconventional demand, resulting in judgment in his favor, became the (late
of suit."
60. In Ohanna v. Ohanna, 129 So. 2d 249, 252-53 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961),
the court, after quoting article 150, stated: "Defendant argues that the provisions
of the above-quoted article have no application to any debts he might have incurred
on account of the community because such debts were created in good faith and
not with the fraudulent view of injuring his wife's rights. A reading of the article
compels a conclusion that it does not establish as a standard that the debts must
be fraudulent. LSA-C.C. art. 150 plainly distinguishes between contracting a
debt on account of the community and the disposing of or alienating the commu-
nity immovables and provides that a fraudulent alienation shall be null. No re-
quirement is made that a contract of indebtedness to be unlawful must be made
with the view of defrauding the wife. Our opinion is that under the clear terms
of said codal article debts such as the ones due by the husband to Berger Bros.,
if contracted for the account of the community after the suit is filed, are un-
lawful." The Third Circuit Court of Appeal followed the distinction set forth in
Ohanna in Landreneau v. Ceasar, 153 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
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lent intent or not."' However, in order to annul an alienation
made by the husband after suit for a separation is filed, it must
be proved that there was a fraudulent view of injuring the
rights of the wife6 2 A debt which is contracted in contraven-
tion of Article 150 is not chargeable to the community, but
must be charged to the husband's separate estate.63 Article 150
by its terms applies only to suits for separation, but there is
no reason why it should not be applicable by analogy to suits
for divorce and several courts have applied article 150 to divorce
actions . 4 The same reasons exist for preventing the husband
from contracting a debt, or alienating property, whether the
action is for separation or divorce.
Byron R. Kantrow, Jr.
THE EFFECT OF GASPARD V. LEMAIRE ON AWARDS
FOR GENERAL DAMAGES
There are several general areas in which the amount of
damages to be awarded a deserving tort claimant is not easily
determined, but particularly difficult problems stand out in de-
termining the amount of awards for pain and suffering. Such
awards are of necessity arbitrary, since pain and suffering are
not commodities which may be assessed in pecuniary terms.'
61. See note 60 supra.
62. See note 60 supra.
63. Ohanna v. Ohanna, 129 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961). According
to the court in Davis v. Davis, 23 So. 2d 651, 654 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945) the
wife has the burden of proving that the husband violated article 150 of the Civil
Code: "It will be observed from this Article that if the husband alienates im-
movable property of the community after institution of suit for separation by the
wife, before the sale can be annulled on the ground of fraudulent intent to cheat
her, she must prove that he acted with such intent and that the alienation was
consummated subsequent to the date of filing of suit for separation or divorce. In
the present case the alienation occurred four days prior to institution of the di-
vorce suit; and it has not been proven that it was fraudulently consummated.
Surely, no semblance of fraud or bad faith on the part of the Millers has been
proven and, even though Davis had been motivated by a desire to circumvent his
estranged wife's interest in the property, proof of this fact alone would not war-
rant annulment of the sale."
64. Gastauer v. Gastauer, 143 La. 749, 79 So. 326 (1918) ; Ohanna v. Ohanna,
129 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
1. See Leggio v. Broussard, 162 So. 2d 23, 26 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964) ("no
adequate rule has yet been devised for the evaluation of pain and suffering");
Thomas v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 83 So. 2d 485, 487 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955)
("the establishment of such a rule [for determining the quantum of damages in
personal injury cases] appears humanly impossible").
